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DETERMINATIVE STATE/RULE 
The applicable determinative statutory provisions are Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1979), Section 35-1-68 (1979) and 
Section 25-1-70 (1980). They are set forth in applicable part as 
follows: 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 35-1-67 (2) (1981) 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation 
during the initial 312-week entitlement, compensation 
shall be 662/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less 
than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent 
child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, 
but not exceeding the maximum established in 
Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the 
injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum 
weekly compensation rate under Subsection (b) 
shall be 36% of the current state average 
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (2) 1979) 
(2) If injury causes death within a period of six 
years from the date of the accident, the employer or 
insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the 
deceased as provided in Section 35-1-81, and further 
benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows: 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-70 (1981) 
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been 
receiving the benefits of this title, at the termination 
of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and 
under all reasonable circumstances should be entitled to 
additional benefits, the Industrial Commission may, in 
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its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but 
the liability of the employer or insurance carrier 
involved shall not be extended, and the additional 
benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special fund 
provided for in subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although Reply Briefs are not required to respond to 
Respondent's Statement of Facts, Respondent's Brief contains an 
alleged Statement of Facts which is potentially prejudicial so it 
should not go unchallenged. 
In their Statement of Facts, Respondents allege that Mr. Hales 
died as a result of "acute intoxication" from a combination of 
drugs and they attach, without citation to the Record, a copy of 
his Autopsy Report. Respondents' statement has the appearance of 
indicating fault on the part of the deceased worker which could be 
construed as an improper attempt to prejudice this Court on a non-
issue before it. Petitioners submit that it is their position that 
the drugs which caused Mr. Hales' death were lawfully prescribed 
for him, and that there is medical evidence establishing that his 
overdose was directly and causally related to his industrial 
accident. However, this is an issue, perhaps, for another day. 
This case as always been treated as one of pure law, i.e., the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (2) 
(1979), and this Court should not be distracted by unsubstantiated 
allegations of fault on the part of the deceased worker. Such 
allegations involve an issue of liability which is not presented in 
the present Petition for Review. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
PETITIONERS HAVE NO CLAIM AGAINST THE EMPLOYERS 
REINSURANCE FUND. 
Respondents have chosen not to defend the rationale and 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge or the Industrial 
Commission in issuing their respective Orders denying Petitioners' 
claims. In fact, Respondents Emery Mining Corporation and Energy 
Mutual Insurance Company, responded to the Petitioners' Motion for 
Summary Disposition on July 10, 1992 essentially conceding that the 
challenged statute constitutes an unconstitutional statute of 
repose in violation of the Utah State Constitution as interpreted 
by this Court in Velarde v. Board of Review. 831 P.2d 123 (Utah 
App. 1992). In addition, Respondent Industrial Commission 
indicated in its Denial of Motion for Review of May 6, 1992, that 
it was "...apparent that Section 35-1-68 (2) is likely to be 
declared unconstitutional." 
Instead, Respondents, Emery Mining Corporation and Energy 
Mutual Insurance Company, have alleged an entirely novel argument 
raised for the first time in their Brief on Appeal to sustain the 
patently unconstitutional statute of repose contained in Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (2) (1979). The sole argument of 
Respondents now is that the challenged statute is constitutional 
because Petitioners have an alternative industrial claim for death 
benefits, namely, a claim against the Employers Reinsurance Fund 
under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-70 
(1981). 
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However, Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-70 (1981) provides 
as follows: 
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been 
receiving the benefits of this title, at the termination 
of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and 
under all reasonable circumstances should be entitled to 
additional benefits, the Industrial Commission may, in 
its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but 
the liability of the employer or insurance carrier 
involved shall not be extended, and the additional 
benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special fund 
provided for in subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68. 
(Emphasis added). 
This is a novel and entirely unprecedented argument. The 
primary problem with Respondents argument is that Section 35-1-70 
(1979) by it's own terms is limited to "wholly dependent persons, 
who have been receiving the benefits of this title...." [Emphasis 
added] Petitioners as allegedly dependent survivors have neither 
directly nor indirectly received any benefits under the Utah 
workers compensation scheme. Respondents claim that the fact that 
since the deceased worker was receiving when he was alive an 
additional $5 per week for his permanent, total disability 
compensation check for his dependent spouse and each dependent 
minor child, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 
(1981), that his spouse and minor children were receiving the 
"benefits of the act". However, this argument fails for at least 
two reasons: 
First, there is no evidence that any portion of Mr. Hales' 
weekly permanent, total disability check sent to him while he was 
alive included an additional dependents' allowance. In fact, 
Petitioners submit that his check did not include additional 
1 
dependents' allowance because he was earning well in excess of the 
state average weekly age at the time of his industrial accident; 
and, therefore, he was entitled to the maximum weekly rate without 
the additional dependents7 allowance being considered. 
Second, it was clearly Mr. Hales who was receiving the 
"benefits of the act" on his claim - not his dependents. Even if 
Mr. Hales received an additional amount on his weekly compensation 
check because he had dependents, this does not mean that 
Petitioners were receiving the "benefits of the act" as dependents 
of a deceased worker - an entirely separate claim. See Velarde, 
supra. See also Martinez v. Industrial Commission, 720 P.2d 416 
(Utah 1986) and State Industrial Insurance System v. Lodge, 822 
P.2d 664 (Nevada 1991). Petitioners had no individual or 
independent claim to Mr. Hales' benefits while he was alive, and 
there is no evidence that they have received any workers 
compensation benefits occasioned by his demise. In fact, such 
benefits have been denied on the basis of the six year statute of 
limitations which is being challenged on constitutional grounds in 
this appeal. 
Under the Respondents' rational any dependent receives 
"benefits of the Act" when their provider - when living - receives 
benefits in his or her own right. There is absolutely no authority 
either by Rule, case law or practice and procedure which would 
support this interpretation and Respondents cite none. The plain 
fact is that Petitioners have no claim against the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund and will receive no compensation at all unless 
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this Court declares the six (6) year statute of repose contained in 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (1979) unconstitutional. 
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund is not a party to this action 
and the Respondents have taken no action, either at the Industrial 
Commission level or on Appeal, to join it as a party 
Defendant/Respondent. The argument of the Respondents, if accepted 
by this Court, would increase the liability of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund and change existing policy and procedure, all 
without the opportunity of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to 
appear and argue against such a new proposed liability. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents a question of pure law; i.e., whether Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-68 (1979) providing for a six year 
statute of limitations constitutes an unconstitutional statute of 
repose when applied to dependents of injured workers who die more 
than six years after the industrial accident allegedly causing 
death. For the reasons stated above and contained in their 
original Brief, Petitioners urge this Court to find the statute 
unconstitutional and remand for further adjudication of their 
claims. 
In the alternative, and assuming that this Court is of the 
opinion that the constitutional challenge to Section 68 may be 
defective for the reason that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund may 
be separately liability for death benefits, this Court should 
remand this case to the Industrial Commission for the purpose of 
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joining the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to allow it to respond to 
Respondents' argument regarding liability on behalf of the Fund 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Secti<Jn^ 35^ vt><70 (1981)y 
DATED this 9th day of November,/ 1992. 
^BNEY & DABNBY, /p.l 
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